Rationalizable trade

DOI10.1006/GAME.1999.0744MaRDI QIDQ1577964zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors N. Delaunay, Stephen Morris, Costis Skiadas

Publication date 16 July 2001

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0744

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetrically informed playersequilibrium traderationalizability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Recommendations

• Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
• Rational expectations can preclude trades
• Information-based trade
• No trade and yes trade theorems for heterogeneous priors
• Information, trade and incomplete markets

Cites work

• Aggregation, determinacy, and informational efficiency for a class of economies with asymmetric information
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Don't Bet on it: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric Information
• Ex ante versus interim rationality and the existence of bubbles
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1234441 (Why is no real title available?)
• On the uniqueness of fully informative rational expectations equilibria
• Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
• Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information

Cited in

(16)

• ``Agreeing to disagree type results: a decision-theoretic approach.
• Information-based trade
• Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness
• The no-trade interval of Dow and Werlang: some clarifications
• No trade and yes trade theorems for heterogeneous priors
• The e-mail game phenomenon
• Information, trade and incomplete markets
• No-trade in the laboratory
• Intermediated Trade *
• Rational expectations can preclude trades
• Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
• IFF YOU WANT ME, I DON'T WANT YOU
• Net trade and market efficiency in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)
• Trade of a common value good
• Common knowledge of rationality and market clearing in economies with asymmetric information
• Indifference and incompleteness distinguished by rational trade

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