Common knowledge of rationality and market clearing in economies with asymmetric information

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2011.10.015zbMATH Open1229.91212OpenAlexW2159177705MaRDI QIDQ654534FDOQ654534

Authors Elchanan Ben-Porath, Aviad Heifetz

Publication date 28 December 2011

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1487.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

rational expectationsasymmetric informationcommon knowledgerationalizabilityexchange economy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42) Economics of information (91B44) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4083326 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2238177 (Why is no real title available?)
• A note on 'fulfilled expectations' equilibria
• Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge
• Common knowledge of rationality and market clearing in economies with asymmetric information
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices
• Rational behavior and rational expectations
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
• The revelation of information and self-fulfilling beliefs

Cited in

(7)

• Common Knowledge and State-Dependent Equilibria
• Common certainty and efficiency with incomplete information
• The rationality of expectations formation
• Common knowledge equilibrium of Boolean securities in distributed information market
• Asymmetric information may protect the commons: the welfare benefits of uninformed regulators
• Dropping rational expectations
• Common knowledge of rationality and market clearing in economies with asymmetric information

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