Common knowledge of rationality and market clearing in economies with asymmetric information

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2011.10.015zbMath1229.91212OpenAlexW2159177705MaRDI QIDQ654534

Aviad Heifetz, Elchanan Ben-Porath

Publication date: 28 December 2011

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1487.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationrational expectationsexchange economycommon knowledgerationalizability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Economics of information (91B44) Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (3)

The rationality of expectations formation ⋮ Common knowledge of rationality and market clearing in economies with asymmetric information ⋮ Dropping rational expectations

Cites Work

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• Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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