Common knowledge of rationality and market clearing in economies with asymmetric information
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2011.10.015zbMATH Open1229.91212OpenAlexW2159177705MaRDI QIDQ654534FDOQ654534
Authors: Elchanan Ben-Porath, Aviad Heifetz
Publication date: 28 December 2011
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/1487.pdf
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Cites Work
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- The revelation of information and self-fulfilling beliefs
- Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices
- A note on 'fulfilled expectations' equilibria
- Anchoring Economic Predictions in Common Knowledge
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Common knowledge of rationality and market clearing in economies with asymmetric information
- Rational behavior and rational expectations
Cited In (6)
- Common certainty and efficiency with incomplete information
- Asymmetric information may protect the commons: the welfare benefits of uninformed regulators
- Common Knowledge and State-Dependent Equilibria
- The rationality of expectations formation
- Dropping rational expectations
- Common knowledge of rationality and market clearing in economies with asymmetric information
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