On the uniqueness of fully informative rational expectations equilibria

DOI10.1007/S001990050240MaRDI QIDQ1275877zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Costis Skiadas, Peter M. DeMarzo

Publication date 4 October 1999

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050240

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationcommon knowledge equilibriaequilibrium notionsrisk neutral rational expectations equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Cited in

(14)

• Aggregation, determinacy, and informational efficiency for a class of economies with asymmetric information
• Partial revelation within rational expectations
• Rationalizable trade
• Common knowledge: The case of linear regression
• Universal state prices and asymmetric information.
• Informational smallness in rational expectations equilibria.
• Robust learning in social networks via matrix scaling
• Updating awareness and information aggregation
• A new approach to the rational expectations equilibrium: existence, optimality and incentive compatibility
• Virtually additive learning
• Asymmetric information and rationalizability
• Common knowledge of rationality and market clearing in economies with asymmetric information
• Information aggregation under ambiguity: theory and experimental evidence
• Trade and revelation of information

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