Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
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Publication:3346115
DOI10.2307/1911197zbMath0552.90097OpenAlexW2143284884MaRDI QIDQ3346115
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1911197
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