Regret matching with finite memory

DOI10.1007/S13235-011-0021-8zbMATH Open1277.91020OpenAlexW2008544883MaRDI QIDQ367483FDOQ367483

Roberto Serrano, Rene Saran

Publication date: 16 September 2013

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-011-0021-8

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zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriaregret matchingclosed sets under same-or-better repliescorrelated equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Calibrated learning and correlated equilibrium
• Potential games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
• Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games
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• Adaptive Heuristics
• Consistency and cautious fictitious play
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Asymptotic calibration
• Conditional universal consistency.
• Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Approachability with bounded memory
• Learning by forgetful players
• The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria
• Better-Reply Dynamics with Bounded Recall
• Learning in games by random sampling
• Stochastic imitation in finite games
• Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium

Cited In (4)

• Learning by forgetful players
• No regrets about no-regret
• Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. I: Fixed and random matching
• Two ``little treasure games driven by unconditional regret

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