Regret matching with finite memory

DOI10.1007/s13235-011-0021-8zbMath1277.91020OpenAlexW2008544883MaRDI QIDQ367483

Roberto Serrano, Rene Saran

Publication date: 16 September 2013

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-011-0021-8

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriaregret matchingclosed sets under same-or-better repliescorrelated equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (2)

Two ``little treasure games driven by unconditional regret ⋮ Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. I: Fixed and random matching

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