Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2007.12.001MaRDI QIDQ931783zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yannick Viossat

Publication date 26 June 2008

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/0902.1964

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary dynamicscorrelated equilibriumeliminationas-if rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Dynamic games (91A25)

Abstract: We show on a 4x4 example that many dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibria, and this for an open set of games. This holds for the best-response dynamics, the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics and any monotonic or weakly sign-preserving dynamics satisfying some standard regularity conditions. For the replicator dynamics and the best-response dynamics, elimination of all strategies used in correlated equilibrium is shown to be robust to the addition of mixed strategies as new pure strategies.

Recommendations

• The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria
• Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics
• Game dynamics and Nash equilibria
• Correlated equilibria and evolutionary stability
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 679849

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3702466 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1226087 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 687780 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
• Adaptive Heuristics
• Adjustment dynamics and rational play in games
• Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Evolutionary Games in Economics
• Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games
• Evolutionary selection against dominated strategies
• Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
• Fictitious play, Shapley polygons, and the replicator equations
• Irrational behavior in the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics
• Is having a unique equilibrium robust?
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• Regret-based continuous-time dynamics.
• Social Stability and Equilibrium
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria
• ``Evolutionary selection dynamic in games: Convergence and limit properties

Cited in

(7)

• Correlated equilibrium in evolutionary models with subpopulations
• Replicator dynamics: old and new
• The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria
• Why learning doesn't add up: Equilibrium selection with a composition of learning rules
• Game dynamics and Nash equilibria
• Regret matching with finite memory
• Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics

This page was built for publication: Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q931783)