Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium
From MaRDI portal
Publication:931783
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2007.12.001zbMATH Open1141.91334arXiv0902.1964OpenAlexW1987517087MaRDI QIDQ931783FDOQ931783
Authors: Yannick Viossat 
Publication date: 26 June 2008
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: We show on a 4x4 example that many dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibria, and this for an open set of games. This holds for the best-response dynamics, the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics and any monotonic or weakly sign-preserving dynamics satisfying some standard regularity conditions. For the replicator dynamics and the best-response dynamics, elimination of all strategies used in correlated equilibrium is shown to be robust to the addition of mixed strategies as new pure strategies.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/0902.1964
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Best response dynamics and socially stable strategies
- Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- Adjustment dynamics and rational play in games
- Fictitious play, Shapley polygons, and the replicator equations
- Social Stability and Equilibrium
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games
- Adaptive Heuristics
- ``Evolutionary selection dynamic in games: Convergence and limit properties
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Evolutionary Games in Economics
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- Regret-based continuous-time dynamics.
- The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria
- Evolutionary selection against dominated strategies
- Is having a unique equilibrium robust?
- Irrational behavior in the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics
- Title not available (Why is that?)
Cited In (7)
- Correlated equilibrium in evolutionary models with subpopulations
- Replicator dynamics: old and new
- The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria
- Why learning doesn't add up: Equilibrium selection with a composition of learning rules
- Game dynamics and Nash equilibria
- Regret matching with finite memory
- Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics
This page was built for publication: Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q931783)
