Correlated equilibrium in evolutionary models with subpopulations

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2005.08.012zbMath1177.91047OpenAlexW2153840691MaRDI QIDQ2507677

Justin Lenzo, Todd Sarver

Publication date: 5 October 2006

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.012

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamicsevolutionary game theorycorrelated equilibriumsubpopulations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Stability of solutions to ordinary differential equations (34D20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

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• Correlated equilibria and evolutionary stability
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Correlated equilibria and local interactions
• Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium

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