A Simple Adaptive Procedure Leading to Correlated Equilibrium
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Publication:4530983
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00153zbMATH Open1020.91003OpenAlexW2126776273WikidataQ28608342 ScholiaQ28608342MaRDI QIDQ4530983FDOQ4530983
Sergiu Hart, Andreu Mas-Colell
Publication date: 28 May 2002
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/525
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