(A)symmetric equilibria and adaptive learning dynamics in small-committee voting
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Publication:6164813
DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104587zbMath1518.91067OpenAlexW4312083861MaRDI QIDQ6164813
Kirill Chernomaz, Johanna M. M. Goertz
Publication date: 4 July 2023
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104587
adaptive learningcommitteesvotinggenetic algorithmasymmetric equilibriaCondorcet jury theoremagent-based simulationssimple plurality rule
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