The role of information in a continuous double auction: an experiment and learning model
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Publication:2168161
DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2022.104387OpenAlexW4223976805MaRDI QIDQ2168161FDOQ2168161
Authors: Mikhail Anufriev, Jasmina Arifovic, Valentyn Panchenko, John O. Ledyard
Publication date: 31 August 2022
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2022.104387
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Cites Work
- Call market book information and efficiency
- Institutional architectures and behavioral ecologies in the dynamics of financial markets
- An illustration of the essential difference between individual and social learning, and its consequences for computational analyses.
- Genetic algorithm learning and the cobweb model
- On the convergence of genetic learning in a double auction market
- Zero-Intelligence Trading Without Resampling
Cited In (4)
- TRADING RESTRICTIONS, PRICE DYNAMICS AND ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY IN DOUBLE AUCTION MARKETS: ANALYSIS BASED ON AGENT-BASED MODELING AND SIMULATIONS
- (A)symmetric equilibria and adaptive learning dynamics in small-committee voting
- The effect of transaction costs on artificial continuous double auction markets
- Markups in double auction markets
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