On the convergence of genetic learning in a double auction market

DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(98)00083-9zbMath1016.91040WikidataQ126572750 ScholiaQ126572750MaRDI QIDQ1960560

Herbert Dawid

Publication date: 12 January 2000

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (12)

Co-evolutionary Agents in Combinatorial Sealed-bid Auctions for Spectrum Licenses Markets ⋮ Machine learning and speed in high-frequency trading ⋮ How robust is the equal split norm? Responsive strategies, selection mechanisms and the need for economic interpretation of simulation parameters ⋮ The role of information in a continuous double auction: an experiment and learning model ⋮ Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms ⋮ The clock proxy auction for allocating radio spectrum licenses ⋮ Can genetic algorithms explain experimental anomalies? ⋮ Specification search in nonlinear time-series models using the genetic algorithm. ⋮ EURACE: A massively parallel agent-based model of the European economy ⋮ Learning to bid: the design of auctions under uncertainty and adaptation ⋮ Particle swarm optimization algorithm for agent-based artificial markets ⋮ Trends in agent-based computational modeling of macroeconomics

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• The sealed-bid mechnism: An experimental study
• A learning approach to auctions
• On the stability of monotone discrete selection dynamics with inertia
• Genetic algorithm learning and the cobweb model
• Genetic algorithms: An overview
• Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
• Adaptive learning by genetic algorithms. Analytic results and applications to economic models
• Auctions with artificial adaptive agents
• Coordination via genetic learning
• Expectations, drift, and volatility in evolutionary games
• Bargaining under Incomplete Information

This page was built for publication: On the convergence of genetic learning in a double auction market