Learning to bid: the design of auctions under uncertainty and adaptation
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Publication:765223
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.08.005zbMATH Open1279.91089OpenAlexW2020060422MaRDI QIDQ765223FDOQ765223
Authors: Thomas H. Noe, Jun Wang, Michael J. Rebello
Publication date: 19 March 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2011.08.005
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
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Cited In (10)
- Adaptive auction mechanism design and the incorporation of prior knowledge
- Artificial Evolution
- Simulating auctions
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- Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective
- Research note-strategic bid-shading and sequential auctioning with learning from past prices
- Auctions with artificial adaptive agents
- Designing bidding strategies in sequential auctions for risk averse agents
- Naive bidding
- Learning to play second-price auctions, an experimental study
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