Experimental analysis of the efficiency of uniform-price versus discriminatory auctions in the England and Wales electricity market
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Publication:1583463
DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(00)00036-1zbMath0956.91038OpenAlexW2070209350WikidataQ127976765 ScholiaQ127976765MaRDI QIDQ1583463
Publication date: 26 October 2000
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(00)00036-1
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74)
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