Experimental analysis of the efficiency of uniform-price versus discriminatory auctions in the England and Wales electricity market
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Publication:1583463
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- Dynamic testing of wholesale power market designs: an open-source agent-based framework
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- Learning to bid: the design of auctions under uncertainty and adaptation
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