Experimental analysis of the efficiency of uniform-price versus discriminatory auctions in the England and Wales electricity market

DOI10.1016/S0165-1889(00)00036-1zbMATH Open0956.91038OpenAlexW2070209350WikidataQ127976765 ScholiaQ127976765MaRDI QIDQ1583463FDOQ1583463

Authors: R. Smith 

Publication date: 26 October 2000

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(00)00036-1

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zbMATH Keywords

auctionuniform pricemarket price

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74)

Cites Work

• Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty
• Auctioning divisible goods

Cited In (10)

• The comparison of pricing methods in the carbon auction market via multi-agent Q-learning
• Behavioural simulations in spot electricity markets
• Auction design for the allocation of carbon emission allowances to supply chains via multi-agent-based model and Q-learning
• What format for multi-unit multiple-bid auctions?
• Agent-based Modeling and Simulation of Competitive Wholesale Electricity Markets
• A smart market for passenger road transport (SMPRT) congestion: an application of computational mechanism design
• Learning to bid: the design of auctions under uncertainty and adaptation
• Dynamic testing of wholesale power market designs: an open-source agent-based framework
• Revisiting minimum profit conditions in uniform price day-ahead electricity auctions
• Learning agents in an artificial power exchange: Tacit collusion, market power and efficiency of two double-auction mechanisms

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