Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty

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Publication:4734992

DOI10.2307/1913707zbMath0684.90008OpenAlexW2047531301MaRDI QIDQ4734992

Paul D. Klemperer, Margaret A. Meyer

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/cccaea58408d7110969b2e75a268701dd392cfea



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