Menu theorems for bilateral contracting

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2005.04.002MaRDI QIDQ860351zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Seungjin Han

Publication date 9 January 2007

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.002

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designmultiple agentsbilateral contractingmultiple principalsmenus

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities
• On the use of menus in sequential common agency
• Bilateral trading with contingent contracts
• Menu mechanisms
• Alternating-offer bargaining over menus under incomplete information

Cites work

• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
• Games Played Through Agents
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities
• Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games

Cited in

(8)

• Sequential contracting with multiple principals
• Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games
• Menu contracts and the division of profits in vertical relationships
• Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness
• Menu mechanisms
• On the use of menus in sequential common agency
• Reciprocal contracting
• Delegation principle for multi-agency games under ex post equilibrium

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