Menu theorems for bilateral contracting
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Recommendations
Cites work
- A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
- Games Played Through Agents
- Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
- Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
- Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities
- Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty
- The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
Cited in
(8)- Sequential contracting with multiple principals
- Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games
- Menu contracts and the division of profits in vertical relationships
- Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness
- Menu mechanisms
- On the use of menus in sequential common agency
- Reciprocal contracting
- Delegation principle for multi-agency games under ex post equilibrium
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