Reciprocal contracting

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.04.003zbMATH Open1330.91028OpenAlexW4229961823MaRDI QIDQ896940FDOQ896940

Michael Peters

Publication date: 15 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.04.003

Recommendations

• Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games
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zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyrevelation principledigital markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Cites Work

• A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment
• Definable and contractible contracts
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A commitment folk theorem
• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Common Agency
• Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
• Sequential contracting with multiple principals
• Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities
• Mechanism Games With Multiple Principals and Three or More Agents
• Contractible Contracts in Common Agency Problems
• On the use of menus in sequential common agency
• Repeated games with incomplete information and discounting
• Equilibrium mechanisms in a decentralized market
• Menu theorems for bilateral contracting
• A folk theorem for competing mechanisms

Cited In (4)

• Private communication in competing mechanism games
• Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples
• Multiproduct trading with a common agent under complete information: existence and characterization of Nash equilibrium
• Codes of conduct, private information and repeated games

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