A folk theorem for competing mechanisms
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Publication:2447055
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2013.01.001zbMath1285.91051MaRDI QIDQ2447055
Cristián Troncoso-Valverde, Michael Peters
Publication date: 23 April 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.01.001
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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