A folk theorem for competing mechanisms

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2013.01.001MaRDI QIDQ2447055zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michael Peters, Cristián Troncoso-Valverde

Publication date 23 April 2014

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.01.001

zbMATH Keywords

collusioncompeting mechanismsimplementable

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• A commitment folk theorem
• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Definable and contractible contracts
• Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
• Generation of Uniform Variates from Several Nearly Uniformly Distributed Variables
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1089168 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3301999 (Why is no real title available?)
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Mechanism design and communication networks
• Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
• Mechanism games with multiple principals and three or more agents
• Program equilibrium
• Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.

Cited in

(14)

• A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
• Competing mechanisms with multi-unit consumer demand
• Sellers' implicit collusion in directed search markets
• On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition
• Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness
• Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: two examples
• Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets
• Private communication in competing mechanism games
• On take it or leave it offers in common agency
• Mechanism design in large games: incentives and privacy (extended abstract)
• Complements, Not Competitors: Causal and Mathematical Explanations
• Private disclosure with multiple agents
• Interacting mechanisms: a perspective on generalized principal-agent problems
• Reciprocal contracting

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