Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune
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Publication:4016697
DOI10.1287/moor.17.2.327zbMath0764.90094OpenAlexW2024687481MaRDI QIDQ4016697
Publication date: 16 January 1993
Published in: Mathematics of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.17.2.327
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