Self-fulfilling mechanisms in Bayesian games

DOI10.1006/game.1998.0670zbMath0912.90292OpenAlexW2092840820MaRDI QIDQ1272627

Françoise Forges, Enrico Minelli

Publication date: 3 January 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0670

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumBayesian gamecommunication equilibriuminfinitely repeated gameself-fulfilling mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations ⋮ Incentive compatible self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations ⋮ Ex post regret and the decentralized sharing of information

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Implementation of Walrasian expectations equilibria
• The revelation of information in strategic market games. A critique of rational expectations equilibrium
• Ex post regret and the decentralized sharing of information
• Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations
• Information at equilibrium
• Universal Mechanisms
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Nonzero-Sum Two-Person Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
• On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
• Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices
• Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace Fortune