Implementation of Walrasian expectations equilibria

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(90)90059-SzbMath0715.90035OpenAlexW2087798591MaRDI QIDQ751980

Lawrence E. Blume, David A. Easley

Publication date: 1990

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90059-s

zbMATH Keywords

exchange economyWalrasian equilibriadifferentially informed tradersfully revealing expectations equilibrianon-exclusivity of information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items

Incomplete markets and individual risks ⋮ Switching from complete to incomplete information ⋮ Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations ⋮ Approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies ⋮ The evolution of monetary equilibrium ⋮ Continuous implementation in economies with incomplete information ⋮ Implementing a public project and distributing its cost ⋮ Incentive compatible self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations ⋮ IRRATIONALITY‐PROOFNESS: MARKETS VERSUS GAMES ⋮ Information, trade and incomplete markets ⋮ Self-fulfilling mechanisms in Bayesian games ⋮ Informational smallness in rational expectations equilibria.

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