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Publication:2642004
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2006.12.002zbMATH Open1178.91100OpenAlexW2022185996MaRDI QIDQ2642004FDOQ2642004
Authors: Olivier Bochet 
Publication date: 20 August 2007
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.12.002
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Cites Work
- Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices
- The revelation of information in strategic market games. A critique of rational expectations equilibrium
- On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
- Continuous implementation of constrained rational expectations equilibria
- Decentralized information and the Walrasian outcome: A pairwise meetings market with private values.
- Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations
- Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings
- Implementation of Walrasian expectations equilibria
- Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations in large markets.
Cited In (3)
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