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DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.12.002zbMath1178.91100OpenAlexW2022185996MaRDI QIDQ2642004

Olivier Bochet

Publication date: 20 August 2007

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.12.002

zbMATH Keywords

implementationrational expectations equilibriumWalrasian equilibriumelementary mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (1)

Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem

Cites Work

• Implementation of Walrasian expectations equilibria
• Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining
• The revelation of information in strategic market games. A critique of rational expectations equilibrium
• Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations
• Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations in large markets.
• Decentralized information and the Walrasian outcome: A pairwise meetings market with private values.
• Continuous implementation of constrained rational expectations equilibria
• Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings
• On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
• Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality

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