Switching from complete to incomplete information
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Recommendations
- Continuous implementation of constrained rational expectations equilibria
- Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
- Incentives and competitive allocations in exchange economies with incomplete markets
- Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence without continuous, convex, and ordered preferences
- Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies.
Cites work
- Continuous implementation of constrained rational expectations equilibria
- Decentralized information and the Walrasian outcome: A pairwise meetings market with private values.
- Implementation of Walrasian expectations equilibria
- Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings
- Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- On Bayesian Implementable Allocations
- Rational Expectations Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices
- Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations
- Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations in large markets.
- The revelation of information in strategic market games. A critique of rational expectations equilibrium
Cited in
(5)- Efficiency and imperfect competition with incomplete markets.
- Mechanism design under alternative information structures and constrained capacity
- Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem
- Implementation of Walrasian expectations equilibria
- Communication requirements and strategic mechanisms for market organization
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