Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem
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Publication:2458426
DOI10.1007/s00182-007-0103-4zbMath1143.91039OpenAlexW2118960133MaRDI QIDQ2458426
Publication date: 31 October 2007
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0103-4
Subgame perfect equilibriumBoundary ProblemImplementabilityResponsivenessJustified sensitivityWalrasian Equilibrium
Noncooperative games (91A10) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Related Items (2)
Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support ⋮ Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
Cites Work
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- Bargaining and Competition Part I: Characterization
- Bargaining and Competition Part II: Existence
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- Subgame Perfect Implementation
- Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Feasible and Continuous Implementation
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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