Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences

DOI10.1007/BF00303168zbMath0669.90006MaRDI QIDQ1119142

Richard D. McKelvey

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicityNash implementationsocial choice correspondencesgame forms\(\alpha\)-majority ruleNo Veto Power

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (22)

Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria in social choice environments ⋮ Credible implementation ⋮ Reexamination of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementability ⋮ A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation ⋮ Computational implementation ⋮ The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: Implementation in Nash equilibrium. ⋮ A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule ⋮ Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem ⋮ Implementation Theory ⋮ On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences ⋮ On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation ⋮ Implementation via rights structures ⋮ Introduction: Special issue of ``Games and Economic Behavior in honor of Richard D. McKelvey ⋮ The scholarship assignment problem ⋮ Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms ⋮ Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions ⋮ Voting over investment ⋮ Impossibility results for choice correspondences ⋮ A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation ⋮ Nash implementation and double implementation: Equivalence theorems ⋮ A new necessary condition for Nash implementation ⋮ Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
• Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
• Implementation of Democratic Social Choice Functions
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Competitive Exchange
• Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods

This page was built for publication: Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences