Game forms for Nash implementation of general social choice correspondences
Several game forms are given for Nash implementing general social choice correspondences (SCC's) which satisfy Maskin's conditions of monotonicity and No Veto Power. The game forms have smaller strategy spaces than those used in previously studied mechanisms: the strategy for an individual consists of an alternative, two subsets (of alternatives), and a player number. For certain types of economic and political SCC's, including \(\alpha\)-majority rule, the Walrasian, and Lindahl correspondence, the strategy space reduces to an alternative and a vector, where the number of components of the vector is at most twice the dimension of the alternative space.
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3307201 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation of Democratic Social Choice Functions
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- Implementation via rights structures
- Voting over investment
- Core implementation via dynamic game forms
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- Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions
- Self-implementation of social choice correspondences in Nash equilibrium
- Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
- Implementation via approval mechanisms
- Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem
- Introduction: Special issue of ``Games and Economic Behavior in honor of Richard D. McKelvey
- A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- A simple sufficient condition for strong implementation
- Implementation theory
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms
- Computational implementation
- Axiomatization and implementation via objections structures
- The scholarship assignment problem
- Strong Nash implementation and economic applications
- Credible implementation
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