Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
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Publication:3907364
DOI10.2307/1911923zbMath0457.90014OpenAlexW2034042326MaRDI QIDQ3907364
Publication date: 1980
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1911923
Nash equilibriastrong equilibriaWalras equilibriaArrow-Debreu pure exchange economygame in strategic form
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