Double implementation in Nash and M-Nash equilibria
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Publication:1925688
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3709875 (Why is no real title available?)
- An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability
- Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
- Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
- Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
- Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Strongly implementable social choice correspondences and the supernucleus
- Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
Cited in
(8)- Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
- An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
- Double implementation in dominant strategy equilibria and ex-post equilibria with private values
- Double implementation by a simple game form in the commons problem
- Double implementation of voting operators
- A simple mechanism for double implementation with semi-socially-responsible agents
- Double implementation without no-veto-power
- Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria in social choice environments
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