Double implementation in Nash and M-Nash equilibria
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Publication:1925688
DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.01.021zbMATH Open1253.91065OpenAlexW1967386364MaRDI QIDQ1925688FDOQ1925688
Authors: Jianxin Yi 
Publication date: 18 December 2012
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.01.021
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Cites Work
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability
- Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
- Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
- Strongly implementable social choice correspondences and the supernucleus
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
- Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
- Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
Cited In (6)
- Double implementation by a simple game form in the commons problem
- Double implementation in Nash and undominated Nash equilibria in social choice environments
- An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
- Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
- Double implementation in dominant strategy equilibria and ex-post equilibria with private values
- Double implementation of voting operators
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