Double implementation in Nash and \(M\)-Nash equilibria
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Publication:1925688
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2012.01.021zbMath1253.91065MaRDI QIDQ1925688
Publication date: 18 December 2012
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.01.021
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