Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
From MaRDI portal
Publication:631122
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2010.10.004zbMath1208.91045OpenAlexW2068320927MaRDI QIDQ631122
Publication date: 22 March 2011
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.10.004
Related Items (2)
Double implementation in Nash and \(M\)-Nash equilibria ⋮ Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation
- Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
- Nash implementation without no-veto power
- Epsilon-Nash implementation
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
- A crash course in implementation theory
- Nash implementation via hyperfunctions
- Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
- Nash Implementation Using Undominated Strategies
- Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
- Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
- Incentives in Teams
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Implementation and Renegotiation
- Voluntary implementation
This page was built for publication: Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
