Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
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Publication:866939
DOI10.1007/S00355-006-0158-3zbMATH Open1134.91362OpenAlexW3123895719MaRDI QIDQ866939FDOQ866939
Authors: Olivier Bochet 
Publication date: 14 February 2007
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/1285055/guid-1218d82d-0362-4eb5-b495-0b3fae9fbb74-ASSET1.0.pdf
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Cites Work
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Exact implementation
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
- Bayesian Implementation
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- Voluntary implementation
Cited In (24)
- Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges
- Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective
- Nash implementation without no-veto power
- Repeated implementation: a practical characterization
- Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support
- Robust implementation in general mechanisms
- Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
- A solution to the two-person implementation problem
- Rationalizable implementation
- Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
- On the implementation of the median
- An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo
- Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions
- Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Voluntary implementation
- Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
- Time and Nash implementation
- Whose opinion counts? Implementation by sortition
- A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions
- Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: Applications.
- Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
- Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria
- Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules
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