Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0158-3zbMath1134.91362MaRDI QIDQ866939

Olivier Bochet

Publication date: 14 February 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/1285055/guid-1218d82d-0362-4eb5-b495-0b3fae9fbb74-ASSET1.0.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B14: Social choice

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Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules, Rationalizable implementation, Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation, Implementation via mechanisms with transfers, Robust implementation in general mechanisms, Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms, Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium, A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions, Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support, Nash implementation without no-veto power, Repeated implementation: a practical characterization, Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective, A solution to the two-person implementation problem, Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions, Time and Nash implementation, Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria, An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo, On the implementation of the median

Cites Work

• Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
• Exact implementation
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• Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
• Bayesian Implementation
• Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
• Voluntary implementation