Recommendations
Cites work
- Bayesian Implementation
- Exact implementation
- Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
- Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
- Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
- Voluntary implementation
Cited in
(29)- Repeated implementation: a practical characterization
- Implementation by self-relevant mechanisms: Applications.
- Whose opinion counts? Implementation by sortition
- Designing referenda: an economist's pessimistic perspective
- A solution to the two-person implementation problem
- Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions
- Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms
- Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges
- Time and Nash implementation
- Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria
- An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo
- On the implementation of the median
- Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium
- Nash implementation and tie-breaking rules
- Rationalizable implementation
- Voluntary implementation
- Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: a unified approach to exact and approximate implementation
- Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
- Robust implementation in general mechanisms
- Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Safe implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
- Safe implementation
- Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
- Two-player rationalizable implementation
- A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions
- Strengthening incentives for truth-telling in majority voting
- Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support
- Nash implementation without no-veto power
This page was built for publication: Nash implementation with lottery mechanisms
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q866939)
