Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.001zbMath1470.91101OpenAlexW3007313795MaRDI QIDQ2049477

Yi-Chun Chen, Yifei Sun, Siyang Xiong, Takashi Kunimoto

Publication date: 25 August 2021

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2355

zbMATH Keywords

complete informationimplementationrationalizabilitysocial choice functioncontinuous implementationinformation perturbationsMaskin monotonicity*

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (4)

Continuous virtual implementation: complete information ⋮ Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions: Complete characterization ⋮ Behavioral implementation under incomplete information ⋮ Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge

Cites Work

• Rationalizable implementation
• Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty
• Exact implementation
• Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences
• Continuous Implementation
• Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
• Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences

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