Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge
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Publication:6163291
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2023.105624zbMath1518.91040OpenAlexW4323267261MaRDI QIDQ6163291
Yifei Sun, Takashi Kunimoto, Yi-Chun Chen
Publication date: 9 June 2023
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2662
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