On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
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Publication:1112743
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(88)90009-9zbMath0659.90097OpenAlexW1969380224MaRDI QIDQ1112743
David M. Kreps, David K. Levine, Drew Fudenberg
Publication date: 1988
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3350444
Nash equilibriumrationalityincomplete information``close games``strict equilibriumfinite n-person normal form gamesnear strict equilibriumnear strictness
Related Items (27)
A revelation principle for correlated equilibrium under trembling-hand perfection ⋮ The theory of normal form games from the differentiable viewpoint ⋮ Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium ⋮ Strong robustness to incomplete information and the uniqueness of a correlated equilibrium ⋮ Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty ⋮ A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction ⋮ On rationalizability in extensive games ⋮ Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique ⋮ Stable equilibria and forward induction ⋮ Tenacious selection of Nash equilibrium ⋮ The robust selection of rationalizability ⋮ Rational behavior under correlated uncertainty ⋮ Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge ⋮ A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games ⋮ Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games ⋮ Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium ⋮ On self-enforcement in extensive-form games ⋮ Robust equilibria under non-common priors ⋮ Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness ⋮ Commitment and observability in games ⋮ Reputation with observed actions ⋮ Generalized backward induction: justification for a folk algorithm ⋮ Perfectly almost strict equilibria for finite games in strategic form ⋮ Perturbed finitely repeated games ⋮ Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs ⋮ Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty ⋮ Can evolutionary dynamics explain free riding in experiments?
Cites Work
- A relation between perfect equilibria in extensive form games and proper equilibria in normal form games
- On stability of perfect equilibrium points
- Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
- Multistage Games with Communication
- An Approach to Communication Equilibria
- Sequential Equilibria
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
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