Recommendations
- Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
- Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
- Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
- On "Reputation" Refinements with Heterogeneous Beliefs
- Reputation and Experimentation in Repeated Games With Two Long-Run Players
Cites work
- Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
- Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
- On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
- Reputation and dynamic Stackelberg leadership in infinitely repeated games
- Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
- Reputation and imperfect information
Cited in
(29)- Reputation and exogenous private learning
- When are nonanonymous players negligible?
- Reputation and dynamic Stackelberg leadership in infinitely repeated games
- Reputation with noisy precommitment
- Reputation in dynamic games
- Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information
- Reputation from nested activities
- Reputation effects in stochastic games with two long-lived players
- Reputation for playing mixed actions: a characterization theorem
- Information asymmetry and reentry
- A reputation for honesty
- Reputation in continuous-time games
- Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
- Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents
- Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
- Limited records and reputation bubbles
- Reputation and Experimentation in Repeated Games With Two Long-Run Players
- Bad Reputation
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1487900 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1556187 (Why is no real title available?)
- Reputation in long-run relationships
- Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
- Simple bounds on the value of a reputation
- Reputation with analogical reasoning
- A "Reputation" Refinement without Equilibrium
- Reputation Building under Observational Learning
- Impermanent types and permanent reputations
- Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring
- When is reputation bad?
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