Reputation and dynamic Stackelberg leadership in infinitely repeated games

DOI10.1006/JETH.1996.0126zbMATH Open0880.90159OpenAlexW1997345325MaRDI QIDQ1361861FDOQ1361861

Authors: Masaki Aoyagi 

Publication date: 1 February 1998

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0126

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zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamelong-run player without discountingperturbed gameStackelberg payoff

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65)

Cited In (15)

• Occurrence of deception under the oversight of a regulator having reputation concerns
• Optimal policy with credibility concerns
• Stochastic Control Approach to Reputation Games
• The emergence of cooperation through leadership
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• On the size and structure of group cooperation
• Reputation with observed actions
• Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information
• Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Repeated sequential prisoner's dilemma: the Stackelberg variant
• Large nonanonymous repeated games
• Reputation effects in stochastic games with two long-lived players
• Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring
• Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts
• Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games

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