Reputation and dynamic Stackelberg leadership in infinitely repeated games
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Publication:1361861
DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.0126zbMath0880.90159MaRDI QIDQ1361861
Publication date: 1 February 1998
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0126
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