Reputation and dynamic Stackelberg leadership in infinitely repeated games
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(17)- Reputation with observed actions
- Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information
- Reputation effects in stochastic games with two long-lived players
- The emergence of cooperation through leadership
- Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games
- Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
- Optimal policy with credibility concerns
- Reputation and Experimentation in Repeated Games With Two Long-Run Players
- Occurrence of deception under the oversight of a regulator having reputation concerns
- Repeated sequential prisoner's dilemma: the Stackelberg variant
- Stochastic Control Approach to Reputation Games
- Large nonanonymous repeated games
- Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts
- Reputation building under uncertain monitoring
- Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring
- On the size and structure of group cooperation
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