Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
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DOI10.2307/1913771zbMATH Open0693.90105OpenAlexW2163189802MaRDI QIDQ3468907FDOQ3468907
Authors: Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine 
Publication date: 1989
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/64081
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- Bounded memory and permanent reputations
- Reputation with noisy precommitment
- Rage against the machines: how subjects play against learning algorithms
- Learning and sophistication in coordination games
- A war of attrition with endogenous effort levels
- Pretending in dynamic games, alternative outcomes and application to electricity markets
- When are nonanonymous players negligible?
- Commitment in first-price auctions
- Limited records and reputation bubbles
- Social preferences? Google answers!
- Reputation and exogenous private learning
- A generalized approach to belief learning in repeated games
- The optimal degree of cooperation in the repeated prisoners' dilemma with side payments
- An experiment on learning with limited information: nonconvergence, experimentation cascades, and the advantage of being slow.
- Bounded memory and incomplete information
- Learning in network contexts: experimental results from simulations
- Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests
- On the size and structure of group cooperation
- Bargaining with imperfect commitment
- Reputation with observed actions
- Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information
- Limited-trust equilibria
- Cooperation and bounded recall
- Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
- Reputation with analogical reasoning
- Signaling future actions and the potential for sacrifice
- Reputation and news suppression in the media industry
- Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships
- Matching in the large: an experimental study
- Switching costs in frequently repeated games.
- Reputation and impermanent types
- Repeated signaling games
- Recursive monetary policy games with incomplete information
- Reciprocity and cooperation in repeated coordination games: The principled-player approach
- A learning-based model of repeated games with incomplete information
- Rationality and bounded rationality
- Order of limits in reputations
- Reputation with one-sided monitoring: ignorance as a commitment device
- Games with espionage
- Impermanent types and permanent reputations
- Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring
- Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts
- Inspection games with long-run inspectors
- Competition on many fronts: A Stackelberg signaling equilibrium
- One-sided patience with one-sided communication does not justify Stackelberg equilibrium
- Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games
- Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria
- When is reputation bad?
- Repeated implementation
- Reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games
- A reputation for honesty
- A two-sided reputation result with long-run players
- Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games
- Sophisticated experience-weighted attraction learning and strategic teaching in repeated games
- Imperfect equilibrium
- Continuous time vs. backward induction
- Induction and the Ramsey policy
- REPUTATION BY IMITATION: AN EVOLUTIONARY MODEL WITH STRATEGIC MATCHING
- Leading to efficient coordination: individual traits, beliefs and choices in the minimum effort game
- Occurrence of deception under the oversight of a regulator having reputation concerns
- The emergence of cooperation through leadership
- Bad reputation with simple rating systems
- Fairly taking turns
- Toxic types and infectious communication breakdown
- A theory of forward induction in finitely repeated games
- Reputation effects under interdependent values
- Reputation for playing mixed actions: a characterization theorem
- Bad apples in symmetric repeated games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Persistence in a dynamic moral hazard game
- A model of gradual information disclosure
- Interactive epistemology in simple dynamic games with a continuum of strategies
- Starting small in project choice: a discrete-time setting with a continuum of types
- Defending against speculative attacks: the policy Maker's reputation
- Dynamic exploitation of myopic best response
- Information asymmetry and reentry
- Reputation effects
- Reputation from nested activities
- Duty to read vs duty to disclose fine print. Does the market structure matter?
- Sequential veto bargaining with incomplete information
- Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games
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