When is reputation bad?

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.08.007zbMath1142.91338OpenAlexW3125477144MaRDI QIDQ932806

B. E. Eshmatov

Publication date: 11 July 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3196337

zbMATH Keywords

game theorycommitmentreputationStackelberg

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (4)

(Bad) reputation in relational contracting ⋮ Envelope theorems for locally differentiable open-loop Stackelberg equilibria of finite horizon differential games ⋮ Reputation and the ``need for enemies ⋮ A dynamic model of certification and reputation

Cites Work

• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Efficiency and observability with long-run and short-run players
• Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• Bad Reputation
• Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
• Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games with Conflicting Interests
• Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
• Who Wants a Good Reputation?

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