Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players

DOI10.2307/2298086zbMath0717.90107OpenAlexW2168678454MaRDI QIDQ5749170

Drew Fudenberg, David M. Kreps, Eric S. Maskin

Publication date: 1990

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3226950

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium payoffsrepeated games with long- and short-run players

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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