Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2021.105222zbMath1461.91039arXiv2007.14002OpenAlexW3132355500MaRDI QIDQ2025018

Yingkai Li, Harry Di Pei

Publication date: 11 May 2021

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.14002

zbMATH Keywords

behaviorrefinementconcentration inequalityreputationaction frequency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Cites Work

• Limited records and reputation bubbles
• Sustainable reputations with rating systems
• Public trust and government betrayal
• Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Commitment through incomplete information in a simple repeated bargaining game
• On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games
• Information Acquisition and Reputation Dynamics
• Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
• Reputation Effects Under Interdependent Values
• Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
• Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players
• On Cumulative Sums of Random Variables

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