Commitment through incomplete information in a simple repeated bargaining game
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Publication:1802039
DOI10.1006/JETH.1993.1037zbMATH Open0803.90141OpenAlexW3125389585MaRDI QIDQ1802039FDOQ1802039
Authors: Klaus M. Schmidt 
Publication date: 8 August 1993
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4605.pdf
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