Price discrimination based on buyers' purchase history

DOI10.1007/s13235-015-0179-6zbMath1391.91098OpenAlexW2236385365MaRDI QIDQ2397932

Ella Segev, Arieh Gavious

Publication date: 14 August 2017

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0179-6

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationprice discriminationpurchase history

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information
• Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the Coase conjecture
• Commitment through incomplete information in a simple repeated bargaining game
• Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect
• Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1
• A Multistage Model of Bargaining
• Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
• Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly
• Intertemporal Price Discrimination
• Optimal Auction Design
• Durable Goods Monopoly with Incomplete Information
• Durable Goods Monopoly with Entry of New Consumers
• A Sequential Stochastic Assignment Problem

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