Price discrimination based on buyers' purchase history

DOI10.1007/S13235-015-0179-6MaRDI QIDQ2397932zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Arieh Gavious, Ella Segev

Publication date 14 August 2017

Published in Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-015-0179-6

zbMATH Keywords

price discriminationincomplete informationpurchase history

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• A Multistage Model of Bargaining
• A Sequential Stochastic Assignment Problem
• Commitment through incomplete information in a simple repeated bargaining game
• Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
• Durable Goods Monopoly with Entry of New Consumers
• Durable Goods Monopoly with Incomplete Information
• Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information
• Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the Coase conjecture
• Intertemporal Price Discrimination
• Optimal Auction Design
• Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect
• Recent developments in the economics of price discrimination
• Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly
• Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1

Cited in

(3)

• Behavior-based price discrimination by a patient seller
• Perfect Bayesian equilibria in repeated sales
• Perfect Bayesian equilibria in repeated sales

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