Repeated contracting without commitment

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2022.105514MaRDI QIDQ2675414zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Zachary Breig

Publication date 23 September 2022

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105514

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentmechanism designposted pricesrenegotiationspot contracting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Recommendations

• Dynamic contracting under adverse selection and renegotiation
• Endogenous and exogenous commitment
• Dynamic screening with limited commitment
• Perfect Bayesian equilibria in repeated sales
• Perfect Bayesian equilibria in repeated sales

Cites work

• Commitment through incomplete information in a simple repeated bargaining game
• Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
• Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• Dynamic adverse selection with a patient seller
• Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect
• Endogenous and exogenous commitment
• Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the Coase conjecture
• On the Value of Commitment with Asymmetric Information
• Optimal auction design under non-commitment
• Perfect Bayesian equilibria in repeated sales
• Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1
• Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts

Cited in

(5)

• Perfect Bayesian equilibria in repeated sales
• Endogenous and exogenous commitment
• Price discrimination based on buyers' purchase history
• Paying not to sell
• Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good

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