Recommendations
Cites work
- Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation
- Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication
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- The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auction
Cited in
(28)- Auction design with opportunity cost
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- Sequentially optimal auctions
- The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities
- Reserve prices in repeated auctions
- Commitment in first-price auctions
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- Dynamic contracting under adverse selection and renegotiation
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- Repeated contracting without commitment
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- Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1
- Auction design without quasilinear preferences
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- Designing Coalition-Proof Reverse Auctions Over Continuous Goods
- Perfect Bayesian equilibria in repeated sales
- Progressive participation
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- Treating symmetric buyers asymmetrically
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- Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
- Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
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