Optimal auction design under non-commitment
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Publication:900604
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.04.007zbMATH Open1330.91103OpenAlexW3125609476MaRDI QIDQ900604FDOQ900604
Authors: Vasiliki Skreta 
Publication date: 22 December 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.04.007
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Cites Work
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Cited In (23)
- Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good
- Treating symmetric buyers asymmetrically
- The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities
- Commitment in sequential auctioning: Advance listings and threshold prices
- Progressive participation
- Dynamic Mechanism Design with Budget-Constrained Buyers Under Limited Commitment
- Auction design without quasilinear preferences
- Reserve prices in repeated auctions
- Reserve price commitments in auctions
- Mechanism Design With Limited Commitment
- Buyers' welfare maximizing auction design
- Auction design with opportunity cost
- An optimal slow Dutch auction
- Perfect Bayesian equilibria in repeated sales
- Introduction to symposium on dynamic contracts and mechanism design
- Lemons and peaches: multi-stage buying mechanisms with a Devil's Menu
- Information design in sequential procurement
- Repeated contracting without commitment
- Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
- Designing Coalition-Proof Reverse Auctions Over Continuous Goods
- Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1
- Design of discrete Dutch auctions with an uncertain number of bidders
- Dynamic contracting under adverse selection and renegotiation
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