Optimal revenue-sharing mechanisms with seller commitment to ex-post effort

DOI10.1007/S00355-021-01351-WMaRDI QIDQ2667579zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Xun Chen, Shanmin Li, Dazhong Wang

Publication date 4 March 2022

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01351-w

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Optimal auction design under non-commitment
• Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1
• Optimal profit sharing mechanisms with type-dependent outside options
• Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions
• Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining

Cites work

• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal contracts with public ex post information
• Optimal equity auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Optimal equity auctions with two-dimensional types
• Optimal profit sharing mechanisms with type-dependent outside options
• Securities auctions under moral hazard: an experimental study
• Security bid auctions for agency contracts

Cited in

(1)

• Optimal profit sharing mechanisms with type-dependent outside options

This page was built for publication: Optimal revenue-sharing mechanisms with seller commitment to ex-post effort

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2667579)