Optimal revenue-sharing mechanisms with seller commitment to ex-post effort
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Publication:2667579
DOI10.1007/s00355-021-01351-wzbMath1485.91106OpenAlexW3179626438MaRDI QIDQ2667579
Shanmin Li, Xun Chen, Dazhong Wang
Publication date: 4 March 2022
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01351-w
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
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