Optimal equity auctions with heterogeneous bidders
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Cites work
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Auctions with cross-shareholdings
- Dynamic mechanism design: a Myersonian approach
- Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
- Ex Post Information in Auctions
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- High bids and broke winners
- Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
- On bidding with securities: risk aversion and positive dependence
- Optimal Auction Design
- Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- Securities auctions under moral hazard: an experimental study
Cited in
(7)- Optimal revenue-sharing mechanisms with seller commitment to ex-post effort
- The broker-optimal bilateral trading mechanisms with linear contracts
- Optimal equity auctions with two-dimensional types
- Optimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities
- Costly auction entry, royalty payments, and the optimality of asymmetric designs
- Optimal equity auction with interdependent valuations
- Optimal profit sharing mechanisms with type-dependent outside options
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