Optimal equity auction with interdependent valuations

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2021.102623zbMATH Open1490.91110OpenAlexW4200346292MaRDI QIDQ2138368FDOQ2138368

Authors: Dazhong Wang, Xinyi Xu 

Publication date: 11 May 2022

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102623

Recommendations

• Optimal equity auctions with two-dimensional types
• Optimal equity auctions with heterogeneous bidders
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zbMATH Keywords

implementationinterdependent valuationsoptimal auctionequity auctionex post feasibility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Minimizing a Submodular Function on a Lattice
• Optimal Auction Design
• Monotone Comparative Statics under Uncertainty
• Robust Mechanism Design
• English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
• Asymmetric English auctions.
• Ex Post Information in Auctions
• An Efficient Auction
• Optimality and robustness of the English auction
• Optimal equity auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Conditionally specified distributions: An introduction. (With comments and a rejoinder).
• Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem
• On efficiency of the English auction
• Optimal profit sharing mechanisms with type-dependent outside options
• A sealed-bid auction that matches the English auction
• Inefficient rushes in auctions
• Optimal equity auctions with two-dimensional types

Cited In (7)

• Optimal forestry contract with interdependent costs
• Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations
• Optimal equity auctions with two-dimensional types
• Optimal equity auctions with heterogeneous bidders
• Prior-free clock auctions for bidders with interdependent values
• An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations
• When and why not to auction

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