When and why not to auction

DOI10.1007/S00199-004-0558-5MaRDI QIDQ818526zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Colin M. Campbell, Dan Levin

Publication date 21 March 2006

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0558-5

zbMATH Keywords

Adverse selection.InterdependenciesPosted prices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cited in

(11)

• Analysis and design for multi-unit online auctions
• Private information revelation in common-value auctions
• Auctions with interdependent valuations
• Prices versus auctions in large markets
• Optimal equity auction with interdependent valuations
• Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly
• Implementation of the revenue-maximizing auction by an ignorant seller
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2096852 (Why is no real title available?)
• An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations
• Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings
• Globalization and profitability of cross-border mergers and acquisitions

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