Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly

DOI10.1007/s00199-006-0123-5zbMath1122.91033OpenAlexW2170180273MaRDI QIDQ2373375

Ronald M. Harstad, Vlad Mares

Publication date: 19 July 2007

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10355/2626

zbMATH Keywords

Mechanism designCommon-value auctionsEx-post individual rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
• Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction
• Information Acquisition in Auctions
• Optimality and robustness of the English auction

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