Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2373375
DOI10.1007/S00199-006-0123-5zbMATH Open1122.91033OpenAlexW2170180273MaRDI QIDQ2373375FDOQ2373375
Authors: Vlad Mares, Ronald M. Harstad 
Publication date: 19 July 2007
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10355/2626
Recommendations
- Full surplus extraction and within-period ex post implementation in dynamic environments
- Surplus extraction and competition
- Genericity and robustness of full surplus extraction
- Information acquisition and full surplus extraction
- Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction
- Full surplus extraction from samples
- Extracting interaction-created surplus
- The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions
- The generic possibility of full surplus extraction in models with large type spaces
- Detectability, duality, and surplus extraction
Cites Work
- Comparing location experiments
- Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Information Acquisition in Auctions
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- Optimal Auction Design
- Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
- Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
- Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions
- Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
- A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
- Optimality and robustness of the English auction
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction
- Continuity in auction design
- Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions
- When and why not to auction
Cited In (1)
This page was built for publication: Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2373375)
