Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly

DOI10.1007/S00199-006-0123-5MaRDI QIDQ2373375zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Vlad Mares, Ronald M. Harstad

Publication date 19 July 2007

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10355/2626

zbMATH Keywords

Mechanism designCommon-value auctionsEx-post individual rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Full surplus extraction and within-period ex post implementation in dynamic environments
• Surplus extraction and competition
• Genericity and robustness of full surplus extraction
• Information acquisition and full surplus extraction
• Uncertainty and robustness of surplus extraction
• Full surplus extraction from samples
• Extracting interaction-created surplus
• The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions
• The generic possibility of full surplus extraction in models with large type spaces
• Detectability, duality, and surplus extraction

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4035521 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions
• Comparing location experiments
• Continuity in auction design
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Information Acquisition in Auctions
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Optimality and robustness of the English auction
• Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
• Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions
• When and why not to auction

Cited in

(1)

• Extracting the Surplus in the Common-Value Auction

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