Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(86)90004-2MaRDI QIDQ899767zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dan Levin, Ronald M. Harstad

Publication date 1 January 2016

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(86)90004-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions
• Repeated common value auctions with asymmetric bidders
• Sequential Common-Value Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders
• Equilibrium selection in common-value second-price auctions
• Common value auctions with asymmetric bidder information
• Common-value auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders and reserve price
• Comparing first and second price auctions with asymmetric bidders
• Auctions with asymmetric common-values: the first-price format
• Symmetric separating equilibria in English auctions
• Properties of Symmetric Incentive Compatible Auctions

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4035521 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions
• A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions

Cited in

(15)

• Comparative static effects of number of bidders and public information on behavior in second-price common value auctions
• Equilibria in open common value auctions
• Successful uninformed bidding
• An experimental study of auctions with a buy price under private and common values
• Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions
• An experimental study of estimation and bidding in common-value auctions with public information
• Equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders
• Large common value auctions with risk averse bidders
• Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly
• How to bid in unified second-price auctions when requests are duplicated
• Symmetric separating equilibria in English auctions
• Value-rationalizability in auction bidding
• On dominance solvable auctions in the general symmetric model
• Private information revelation in common-value auctions
• Properties of Symmetric Incentive Compatible Auctions

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