Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(86)90004-2zbMath1328.91131MaRDI QIDQ899767

Dan Levin, Ronald M. Harstad

Publication date: 1 January 2016

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(86)90004-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

An experimental study of auctions with a buy price under private and common values, Successful uninformed bidding, Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions, On dominance solvable auctions in the general symmetric model, Equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders, An experimental study of estimation and bidding in common-value auctions with public information, Private information revelation in common-value auctions, Comparative static effects of number of bidders and public information on behavior in second-price common value auctions, Value-rationalizability in auction bidding, Large common value auctions with risk averse bidders, Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly, Equilibria in open common value auctions

Cites Work

• Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions
• A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions
• Unnamed Item