Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions
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Publication:899767
DOI10.1016/0165-1765(86)90004-2zbMATH Open1328.91131OpenAlexW4230336432MaRDI QIDQ899767FDOQ899767
Publication date: 1 January 2016
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(86)90004-2
Recommendations
- Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions
- Repeated common value auctions with asymmetric bidders
- Sequential Common-Value Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders
- Equilibrium selection in common-value second-price auctions
- Common value auctions with asymmetric bidder information
- Common-value auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders and reserve price
- Comparing first and second price auctions with asymmetric bidders
- Auctions with asymmetric common-values: the first-price format
- Symmetric separating equilibria in English auctions
- Properties of Symmetric Incentive Compatible Auctions
Cites Work
- Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions
- A Convergence Theorem for Competitive Bidding with Differential Information
- A Class of Dominance Solvable Common-Value Auctions
Cited In (15)
- Comparative static effects of number of bidders and public information on behavior in second-price common value auctions
- Equilibria in open common value auctions
- Successful uninformed bidding
- An experimental study of auctions with a buy price under private and common values
- Symmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions
- An experimental study of estimation and bidding in common-value auctions with public information
- Equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders
- Large common value auctions with risk averse bidders
- Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly
- How to bid in unified second-price auctions when requests are duplicated
- Symmetric separating equilibria in English auctions
- Value-rationalizability in auction bidding
- On dominance solvable auctions in the general symmetric model
- Private information revelation in common-value auctions
- Properties of Symmetric Incentive Compatible Auctions
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