Auctions with asymmetric common-values: the first-price format

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2006.03.008zbMath1155.91374OpenAlexW2025617830MaRDI QIDQ2384442

Xavier Jarque, Maria Angeles de Frutos

Publication date: 21 September 2007

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/15088

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric biddersoptimal auctionsspectrum auctionsCommon-value auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Reputation in repeated second-price auctions
• Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty
• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
• Asymmetric Auctions

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