Asymmetric Auctions
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Publication:4512696
DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00137zbMath0981.91029MaRDI QIDQ4512696
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Publication date: 5 March 2002
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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