Asymmetric first-price auctions with uniform distributions: analytic solutions to the general case

DOI10.1007/s00199-010-0563-9zbMath1245.91039OpenAlexW2139562975WikidataQ57920629 ScholiaQ57920629MaRDI QIDQ431221

Shmuel Zamir, Todd R. Kaplan

Publication date: 26 June 2012

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10036/4246

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationasymmetric auctionsfirst-price auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (25)

COMPARISONS ON LARGEST ORDER STATISTICS FROM HETEROGENEOUS GAMMA SAMPLES ⋮ Efficiency versus optimality in procurement ⋮ Auctioning risk: the all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences ⋮ Procurement auctions with capacity constrained suppliers ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ Prebidding first-price auctions with and without head starts ⋮ Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings ⋮ Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions ⋮ Shapley-Folkman-Lyapunov theorem and asymmetric first price auctions ⋮ Preferential treatment in procurement auctions through information revelation ⋮ Ranking asymmetric auctions ⋮ A first-price sealed-bid asymmetric auction when two bidders have respective CRRA and general utility functions ⋮ A Multi-Attribute Reverse Auction Model on Margin Bidding ⋮ Procurement auctions with ex post cooperation between capacity constrained bidders ⋮ Competitive bidding in asymmetric multidimensional public procurement ⋮ Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction ⋮ Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions ⋮ Ranking reversals in asymmetric auctions ⋮ Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices ⋮ Sequential bidding in asymmetric first price auctions ⋮ A first price auction with an arbitrary number of asymmetric bidders ⋮ Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction ⋮ Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations ⋮ Ex-ante welfare superiority of the Boston mechanism over the deferred acceptance mechanism ⋮ Numerical Solution of Asymmetric Auctions

Cites Work

• Contests with rank-order spillovers
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• Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Continuity of the first price auction Nash equilibrium correspondence.
• Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price
• Asymmetric first price auctions
• The effect of bidders' asymmetries on expected revenue in auctions
• Log-concave probability and its applications
• Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
• Toward a study of bidding processes part IV ‐ games with unknown costs
• Winner-take-all price competition

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