Characterization and computation of Nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information
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Publication:1189670
DOI10.1007/BF01271133zbMath0763.90037MaRDI QIDQ1189670
Publication date: 27 September 1992
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
boundary-value problem; system of singular differential equations; continuous sealed-bid auction; set of Nash-equilibria
91A10: Noncooperative games
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
Cites Work
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- Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
- Bilateral trade with the sealed bid k-double auction: Existence and efficiency
- A comparison of pricing rules for auctions and fair division games
- Bargaining under Incomplete Information
- Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- Optimal Auction Design
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- Toward a study of bidding processes part IV ‐ games with unknown costs